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ABSTRACT 
As Iran’s nuclear capabilities continue to be at the forefront of policy and security issues 
for many nations, the methods by which Iran perpetuates further instability are equally 
strategic.  Militant-proxy groups, such as Hezbollah, have significant military 
capabilities, as well as political influence that are the driving forces behind Iran’s 
regional influence. 
Concurrent to the intensive use of proxies, Iran is deliberately trying to weaken 
regimes through information framing.  Iran’s addresses to the Arab world are framed to a 
specific audience and with the tone of animosity towards the West and non-Muslims.  
Hezbollah also serves as a viable source for Iran’s information framing; while 
Hezbollah’s military and political sphere of influence within Lebanon continues to 
impose Lebanon’s governmental control, Iran has achieved political success under 
Hezbollah’s guise.  This thesis explores the symbiotic relationship between Hezbollah 
and Iran and will center on how Iran has achieved relative success in destabilizing Gulf 
States.  This thesis explores the overarching theme between the use of Hezbollah and 
information framing, and the correlation between the reception of the Gulf region, as 
observable effects of success. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The current trend in policy towards Iran often focuses on the growing Iranian nuclear 
threat; however, more critical to the evolution of Iran’s power is an assessment of Iran’s 
use of proxies, specifically Hezbollah and information framing.  Iran’s strategy is to 
enhance its influence in the Middle East both through the use of local proxies and 
through the shaping of information in ways designed to undercut regime stability in Arab 
countries. Through its symbiotic relationship with Hezbollah, Iran is achieving a level of 
deniability, as well as tactical buffers between Gulf States; furthermore, information 
framing is targeted towards neighboring regimes with the intent to create the illusion that 
Iran’s actions are categorically linked to unwarranted and unwanted Western influence.  
While Hezbollah emerged during the Iranian Revolution seemingly an Iranian 
organization from day one, the evolution of the organization into a mainstream political 
party has reenergized Iran’s strategic position in the Gulf.  In order to understand Iran’s 
capabilities, the viewpoint must be from the periphery; where analysts gauge Iran’s 
power from the center (i.e., Tehran), the true nature of Iran’s capabilities must be 
observed from Lebanon. 
 From the perspective of Iranian leaders and from the perspective of Hezbollah’s 
framing strategy, Iran has demonstrated strengths in its abilities to mobilize support from 
citizens of the Gulf region, while maintaining a threat to governmental emissaries.  Iran’s 
framing process is the most lethal instrument in its destabilization campaign.   
 This thesis analyzes Iran’s overarching destabilization goal: to use proxies 
intensely and to try deliberately to weaken regimes through information strategy.  The 
thesis demonstrates a causal understanding of Iran’s influence by analyzing the symbiotic 
relationship between Iran and Hezbollah and the level of reciprocity of Gulf States to 
Iran’s information campaign.  When analyzed, Iran’s intensified use of Hezbollah and 
information framing, in its destabilization campaign, indicates that Iran’s role in the Gulf 
region has extended beyond sovereign confines. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
 As Iran’s nuclear capabilities continue to be at the forefront of policy and security 
issues for many nations, the methods by which Iran perpetuates further instability are 
equally strategic.  Militant-proxy groups, such as Hezbollah, have significant military 
capabilities as well as political influence that are the driving forces behind Iran’s regional 
influence.  As a result of Iran’s military proxies in the Gulf region, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) members are reevaluating security measures to counter Iran’s web of 
connections.  The practicality of Iran’s proxy warfare in the combat of regional 
adversaries is, in all respects, a deliberate strategy to intensify the spread of Iranian 
influence in the Arab world.   
 Concurrent to the intensive use of proxies, Iran is deliberately trying to weaken 
regimes through information framing.  Iran’s addresses to the Arab world are framed to a 
specific audience and with the tone of animosity towards the West and non-Muslims.  
Iran’s strategic spokespersons seemingly remove themselves from the regime and then 
claim Iran’s problems, or courses of destabilization, are the result of Western influence or 
diplomatic “misunderstandings.”1  Hezbollah also serves as a viable source for Iran’s 
information framing; while Hezbollah’s military and political sphere of influence within 
Lebanon continues to impose Lebanon’s governmental control, Iran has achieved 
political success under Hezbollah’s guise.   
 Elements of this thesis center on the approach in which Iran has used information 
framing and the intensified use of the proxy group Hezbollah to destabilize Gulf States.  
It will focus on how Iran has used Hezbollah to frame political issues and spread Iranian 
influence to the general population.  As Hezbollah continues to transform into a 
legitimate political and social organization, this thesis will explore the symbiotic 
relationship between Hezbollah and Iran and will center on how Iran has achieved 
                                                 
1 Anthony A. Cordesman and Martin Kleiber, Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities 
(Westport, CT: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 20. 
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relative success in destabilizing Gulf States.  This thesis explores the overarching theme 
between the use of Hezbollah and information framing, and the correlation between the 
reception of the Gulf region, as observable effects of success. 
B. BACKGROUND 
 Understanding the significance of Hezbollah to Iran’s influence campaign 
requires an analytic assessment of Iran’s capabilities as a state.  As Anthony A. 
Cordesman and Martin Kleiber write, “Iran carries out activities under diplomatic cover, 
uses commercial entities and dummy corporations, and sometimes uses elements of Iran’s 
regular forces.”2  However, since Hezbollah remains the primary proxy force for Iran, 
Iran’s strategy is significantly rooted in Hezbollah’s individual campaign.  Since 
Hezbollah has been assessed to be a threat to regional interests by GCC countries and the 
United States, it is important to understand the criticality of Hezbollah in Iran’s 
information framing and influence campaign. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
The challenge raised in valuing the level of Iran’s success in its influence 
campaign is from the lack of a fluent methodology for effectively gauging the level of 
reciprocity.  Though public-opinion polls highlight the perceptions of Iran and Hezbollah, 
the perceived problem in analyzing polling data are the analytical misconceptions that are 
present in the conclusions.  Public data is often debatable through the methodologies and 
specifically by Arab practices (i.e., censorship as influence); therefore, if reports indicate 
that Arab-nation populations find widespread concern about Iran, yet they fail to assess 
all of the data, the conclusion is inherently flawed.   
Gregg Carlstrom addresses this perceived problem in polling data successfully.  
Carlstrom notes that in a public opinion poll conducted in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
                                                 
2 Cordesman and Kleiber, Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities, 202. 
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Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates,3 widespread concern about Iran’s 
nuclear program is present; however, he further analyzes the data and recognizes inherent 
flaws in evidence that should suggest that Arab publics do not view Iran as an existential 
threat.4  Carlstrom pinpoints the polling flaws and analytical misconceptions:  
The survey does find widespread concern about Iran’s nuclear program: 
58 percent of respondents think Iran wants nuclear weapons, and 40 
percent support “pressur[ing] Iran to stop its program.”  Further on, 
though, the poll asks respondents to pick the two countries ‘that you think 
pose the biggest threat to you.’ Israel is first, at 88 percent; the United 
States is second, at 77 percent.  Iran (13 percent) comes in slightly ahead 
of China (9 percent).5 
 Furthermore, analytical assumptions and conclusions are based on governmental 
strategies; while public-opinion polls may indicate that the public perceives Iran and its 
proxy, Hezbollah, as an indirect threat, reports often highlight Arab and Western 
governments’ perceptions of Iran’s influence.  Two archetypal themes appear: one that 
casts Iran as a formidable threat in the region and Hezbollah as a “terrorist group,” 
fighting to spread Iran’s Islamic Revolution (started in 1979); the second portrays the 
policies of Iran as “misunderstood” and Hezbollah as a legitimate resistance organization, 
acting as a proxy force for Iran.  This thesis argues that while Iran is a formidable threat 
in the region, through its intensified use of Hezbollah, which has transformed itself into a 
legitimate political actor, Iran is maintaining a level of deniability that correlates with its 
influence strategy.   
 This thesis explores the contention that when Iran uses proxy groups such as 
Hezbollah to strike in foreign countries, and when it addresses the Arab world both as a 
state and strategically through Hezbollah, it does so in a way to try and drive wedges 
between nations—thus doing so successfully, to some degree.   
                                                 
3 The following study was used in Carlstrom’s analysis: University of Maryland and Zogby 
International, “2009 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey,” Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and 
Development, April–May 2009, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2009/0519_arab_opinion/2009_arab_public_opinion_poll.
pdf (accessed February 5, 2010). 
4 Gregg Carlstrom, “The Grand (And Mythical) Alliance Against Iran,” The Majlis, February 2, 2010, 




D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The literature reviewed for this thesis is twofold: one set of sources explores Iran 
as an individual state-entity with non-state actors, and the second set of sources explores 
Hezbollah as an organizational entity.  The first set of sources focuses on Iran as the 
ultimate military, asymmetric, ideological, and opportunistic threat in the Gulf region.  
Gauging historical trends and the current diplomatic struggle with Iran, the first set of 
sources identifies the broad scope of the Iranian threat.  The second set of sources focuses 
on Hezbollah from two different perspectives: the first perspective represents Hezbollah 
as a terrorist organization, acting on behalf of Iran; the second perspective represents 
Hezbollah as a rational actor and a social movement, while still maintaining an alliance 
with Iran.  This thesis focuses on and argues for the second perspective, and focuses on 
the strategic gain for Iran.  
 Source material reviewed for this thesis included books, online newspaper 
articles, public-opinion polls, and other publications.  While sources on Iran proved to be 
judgmental of Iran’s current policy, such sources were a viable medium to understand the 
level of success that Iran has achieved in its efforts to spread the Iranian Revolution.   
 The best and most concise analysis and model for current trends is Iran’s Military 
Forces and Warfighting Capabilities: The Threat in the Northern Gulf, by Anthony A. 
Cordesman and Martin Kleiber.  Cordesman and Kleiber chronicle the intentions and 
capabilities that Iran has both maintained and enhanced since the Iranian Revolution.  
The narrative is straightforward and focuses on the capabilities of Iran’s military sectors, 
programs, and strategic and ideological operations.  While also providing a narrative 
analysis of Iran’s capabilities, Cordesman and Kleiber provide numerous statistics and 
tables that gauge Iran’s military strengths and evidence that suggests that Iran’s strategy 
in the Gulf region is to wage a war of intimidation, with the intent to pressure its 
neighbors to either abandon policies or to drive wedges between nations who support 
action against Iran.  Furthermore, Cordesman and Kleiber argue that Iran’s use of state 
and non-state actors as proxies and partners is a critical element that will define the 
relative power that Iran may gain in the region.6  Although Cordesman and Kleiber 
                                                 
6 Cordesman and Kleiber, Iran’s Military Forces, 202. 
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address the possibility of Iran’s intentions to use proxy groups as a strategic offense 
mechanism, they fail to definitively identify whether Iran’s strategy is or has been 
successful.  
 However, Cordesman and Kleiber argue that Iran has been successful in low-level 
operations, with the use of proxy groups, because Iran is successfully intimidating Gulf 
States without making any react in a hostile way.7 This argument suggests that Iran has 
demonstrated both successes and failures in its use of non-state actors: in low-level 
operations, the lack of accountability credits Iran in its strategic use of proxy groups 
because it demonstrates Iran’s capabilities as a threat to the region while avoiding total 
conflict; however, in large-scale conflicts, Iran seemingly becomes entwined in far more 
serious conflicts with multiple countries. The use of case studies makes this assertion all 
the more persuasive.   
 A more definitive analysis of the gauge of Iran’s level of success is given by 
Ronen Bergmen in The Secret War with Iran.  While Cordesman and Kleiber focus on all 
of Iran’s capabilities with emphasis on military intentions, Bergmen’s analysis recognizes 
Iran’s complexity and intensified use of proxy groups.  As Bergman cites former U.S. 
director of national intelligence Michael McConnell:  
Iran’s influence is rising in ways that go beyond the menace of its nuclear 
program.  The fall of the Taliban and Saddam, increased oil revenues, 
Hamas’s electoral victory, and Hezbollah’s perceived recent success in 
fighting against Israel all extend Iran’s shadow in the region…Iranian 
President Ahmadinejad’s administration…has stepped up the use of more 
assertive and offensive tactics to achieve Iran’s longstanding goals.8   
As Bergman asserts, Iran has more than fully demonstrated success in the use of 
proxy groups beyond low-level intensity.  Though Bergman’s assertions address a more 
realistic approach to world leader’s viewpoints on Iran’s influence, Bergman, as well as 
Cordesman and Kleiber, fail to address what constitutes “success.” 
 A first-hand perspective that offers both historical accounts of Iran’s strategies as 
well as significant warnings about the importance of Hezbollah to Iran are accounted by 
                                                 
7 Cordesman and Kleiber, Iran’s Military Forces, 203. 
8 Ronen Bergman, The Secret War with Iran: The 30-Year Clandestine Struggle Against the World’s 
Most Dangerous Terrorist Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 2007), 384.   
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Robert Baer in The Devil We Know: Dealing With the New Iranian Superpower.  As an 
ex-CIA operative, Baer’s accounts show that Iran has maneuvered itself into a powerful 
position in the region by engaging in a “soft takeover” through its proxy strategy.9  
Through anecdotes and clandestine-source information, Baer provides factual-account 
details about the ideological and theocratic differences that have blinded analysts into a 
mirror-imaging mindset.  Particularly stirring is Baer’s thematic message: Iran’s nuclear 
capabilities are far less important than the legitimacy and potency of Hezbollah in Iran’s 
influence campaign.  Baer writes:  
Iran may not yet have nukes, but it has three things that are vastly more 
important: highly developed asymmetrical fighting skills and weapons; a 
growing army of hungry, disaffected, street-smart fighters; and an 
invincible anticolonial message.10   
The upshot of the book is the point that Iran’s power is ultimately gained from its 
asymmetric capabilities specifically through the use of Hezbollah, and that in order to 
oppress the current trend of destabilization in the region, the United States must opt to 
address Iran as an ally rather than a foe.  Ultimately, as Baer argues, Iran’s powerhouse 
exponentially increases, based on the success of its asymmetrical operations in other 
nations.   
 Augustus Richard Norton offers a non-biased, historical analysis of the chronicles 
of Hezbollah in Hezbollah: A Short Story.  Accounting for the inception of Hezbollah 
until 2006, Norton’s narrative is straightforward and offers casual predictions.  Norton’s 
analysis is indicative of the dynamic nature and the transformations of Hezbollah, from a 
radical guerrilla force to a legitimate social and political organization.  While focusing on 
Hezbollah, Norton’s premise seemingly argues for a reoccurring theme in Hezbollah’s 
politics: Hezbollah is Iran’s protégé.11 
 A more thorough and first-hand account of Hezbollah’s dynamic nature and the 
receptiveness of the Arab public is Judith Palmer Harik’s Hezbollah: The Changing Face 
                                                 
9 Robert Baer, The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower (New York: Crown 
Publishers, 2008), Introduction on front flap. 
10 Ibid., 111. 
11 Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short Story.  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
2007), 72. 
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of Terrorism.  Harik’s analysis centers on the social-movement perspective of Hezbollah, 
whereby her perceptions of the United States, specifically the Bush Administration’s 
aggressive stance towards Hezbollah, elicit possible predictions for Lebanon and the Gulf 
region.  The most important element of Harik’s analysis is the detailed accounts of 
Hezbollah’s information framing, both from the standpoint of its strategies and gauging 
the level of success.  Although Harik focuses more on Hezbollah’s alliance with Syria, 
her evaluation of Hezbollah’s addresses the Janus-faced nature by which Hezbollah 
operates and frames its messages, or poignantly, its “ideological ambiguity.”12 
 Lastly, Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, edited 
by Nicholas Noe, is a compilation of the speeches between 1989 and 2006 given by the 
current leader of Hezbollah.  Though Noe presents a brief historical context prior to each 
speech, his personal analysis extends only to address stirring points linked to U.S. 
interests.  Voice of Hezbollah serves as a crucial analytical reference in understanding 
Harik’s general assertion of Hezbollah’s “ideological ambiguity.”  Furthermore, Voice of 
Hezbollah is insightful into seeing the progression of Hezbollah—from a clandestine 
militia to a mainstream political party.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
 As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, a methodology for effectively gauging 
the successfulness of Iran’s methodology of spreading Iranian influence does not exist.  
In analyzing the literature, all indications suggest that there are multiple viewpoints on 
what constitutes “success.”  Information readily available is at best a strategic start to 
conduct personal analysis to determine a combination of perceptions that will link Iran’s 
success to regional instability, disunity, and evaluation of security measures.  Assessing 
the successfulness of Iran’s strategies requires observing regional and government 
response.  For example, observing the legitimacy of Hezbollah by Arab countries; or, 
how Iran’s use of information framing is destabilizing regional alliances. This analytic 
methodology allows for a study of the efficacy of each method of Iran’s strategy by  
 
                                                 
12 Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. 
Ltd, 2005), 66. 
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analyzing the response to the dependent variable (i.e., Iran’s effective influence) to the 
response of the independent variables (i.e., the reception of Iran’s methodologies: use of 
proxies and information framing). 
 The source material, which supports this approach, is mainly public-opinion polls.  
Although problems exist in analyzing public-opinion data, it is necessary to determine the 
effectiveness of Iran’s individual framing and Hezbollah’s framing based on population 
(i.e., who the message targets and the response). 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The core of the thesis aims to show that Iran’s strategy to enhance its influence in 
the Middle East is thematically linked to its use of proxies, specifically Hezbollah, and 
information framing, both from the state and Hezbollah.   
The thesis is organized into three sections.  The first section addresses the role of 
proxies to Iran and the function and achievements of Hezbollah, and the purpose that it 
serves Iran.  The second section addresses the purpose of information framing and the 
significant power that Iran has gained from Hezbollah’s popularity, which has also been 
achieved through information framing.  The third section is the conclusion, which also 








II. IRAN’S PROXY HEZBOLLAH: THE PUPPETEER AND THE 
PUPPET 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As asymmetrical warfare is beginning to dominate modern battlefields, the critical 
questions of an opponent’s capabilities and intent takes a new approach.  Where 
strategies once aimed to address alliances, foreign actors (i.e., proxies) must now be 
included in analysis.  Proxies are used to serve a multitude of political purposes, but their 
fundamental role to a state is to provide deniability.  Cordesman and Kleiber write: “The 
use of allies and proxies is generally cheap, reduces risk, and acts as a force multiplier.  It 
also provides some degree of deniability—plausible or implausible…”13  This “veneer of 
deniability” in which proxies operate allows both the state and the organization to work 
symbiotically to achieve political and military objectives.14  Where many accounts of the 
use of proxies symbolize a puppeteer commanding a puppet (i.e., the proxy), it is perhaps 
an understatement of the credibility that the puppeteer achieves.  Cordesman and Kleiber 
summate the reciprocities, or tactical achievements that proxies appropriate to Iran: 
Like direct forms of asymmetric operations, the use of foreign actors can 
be both defensive and offensive.  It can also serve ideological and 
religious causes.  It also is extremely difficult to establish a motive and the 
scale of such efforts under many conditions, particularly since they can be 
conducted without attribution to Iranian government support (false flags) 
or under conditions where the Iranian government can claim any 
document incident was a rogue operation it did not authorize.  A 
sophisticated effort can take on the character of a three-dimensional chess 
game in which most of the one side’s players are truly what they seem and 
that player keeps changing the rules without announcing the changes.15 
 The duality of the deniability-credibility nature that proxies achieve creates an 
interesting study.  However, where most analytical assumptions target one entity more 
powerful than the other, Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah, sheds vital light on Iran’s exploitation 
of opportunities.  Iran’s legitimacy as a formidable force has been significantly 
                                                 
13 Cordesman and Kleiber, Iran’s Military Forces, 203. 
14 Bergman, The Secret War with Iran, ix. 
15 Cordesman and Kleiber, Iran’s Military Forces, 203. 
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influenced by Hezbollah’s individual rising support.  The very core of Iran’s power is 
significantly related to Hezbollah’s political and military operations.  Baer contends that 
Iran’s proxy warfare is perhaps the most damaging element that strategists must address, 
because if a war should be fought in the Gulf, “Iran will almost certainly fall back on its 
asymmetrical tactics as weapons.”16  Where proxies serve to act as scapegoats or political 
buffers, Iran has seemingly turned Hezbollah into a power source of legitimacy.  While 
analysts continue to scrutinize over Iran’s intent, Baer has observed that Iran’s strategy 
all along has been to use a war of proxies.   
Scratch away the veneer of Islam, and what you find in an Iranian is old-
fashioned nationalism —a deep, abiding defiance of colonialism.  Keep 
scratching and what you find at the bottom of Iran’s soul is a newfound 
taste for empire.  It runs through Iranian society, even among more secular 
Iranians.  But Iran isn’t a new Rome, intent on naked conquest, cultural 
diffusion, settlements, and religious conversion.  What drives Iran to 
empire is something different.  Call it destiny, entitlement, or even 
manifest destiny: what’s critical to understand is that Iran today has an 
unshakable belief in its right to empire.  It means to achieve this through 
proxy warfare and control over oil supplies.17 
 This chapter explains the function of Hezbollah to Iran’s influence strategy.  As 
the chapter shows, while Hezbollah emerged during the Iranian Revolution seemingly an 
Iranian organization from day one, the evolution of the organization into a mainstream 
political party has reenergized Iran’s strategic position in the Gulf.  In order to understand 
Iran’s capabilities, the viewpoint must be from the periphery; where analysts gauge Iran’s 
power from the center (i.e., Tehran), the true nature of Iran’s capabilities and “imperial 




                                                 
16 Baer, The Devil We Know, 110.   
17 Ibid., 4. 
18 Ibid., 5. 
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B. BACKGROUND 
1. The Inception of Iran’s Imperial Blueprint 
While most nations think in presidential terms and years, Iran plans in terms of 
eras; following the same long-term goals of Ayatollah Khomeini’s vision of an Islamic 
Republic, the modern state of Iran has patiently capitalized on chaos.  In 1982, when 
Israel invaded Lebanon, Iran saw opportunities in extending its revolutionary ideologies.  
Like the recruitments of the Revolutionary Guards during the revolution, Iran has 
strategically used military actors for both offensive and defensive religious and 
ideological purposes.19  Exploiting a deep sense of nationalism, Iran capitalized on the 
Islamic Revolution to wield significant influence over Lebanon’s street and guerilla 
fighters.   
Combine this [strategy] with Lebanese rejection of occupation, add money 
and organization, and the Iranians discovered they would have at their 
service the most lethal guerrilla army in modern history…The Lebanon 
war is Iran’s blueprint for its new empire, fought for and held by 
proxies.20   
2. Hezbollah’s Emergence  
Hezbollah’s inception was a result of failures within active resistance-movements. 
As political mobilization of the Lebanese Shi’a, specifically the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO), began to show signs of corruption amidst a population with a single 
cause to resist Israeli occupation, activism was revitalized in the form of Amal.21  
However, “In Lebanon political support is conditional and political loyalty sometimes has 
a short life.”22  Though Hezbollah fighters emerged during the civil war in Lebanon, the 
organization did not gain momentum until the dynamics of Amal began to  
                                                 
19 The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was founded in 1979 by Ayatollah Khomeini to 
establish control over Iran and to undercut Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan’s government.  The 
Revolutionary Guards tortured and assassinated those opposed to the revolution.  Currently, the 
Revolutionary Guards are almost entirely integrated into Iran’s regular armed forces.  For further 
information, see Sandra Mackey, The Iranians (New York: Penguin Group, 1998), 289–291. 
20 Baer, The Devil We Know, 54. 
21 Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism, 22.   
22 Norton, Hezbollah, 17. 
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unravel; as the PLO failed to provide a nationalist-idealistic cause, Amal had become a 
patronage system in which the Lebanese saw as pacification to its Syrian commands.23 
Norton writes:  
Syria has no overall interest in seeing Amal or Hezbollah (or any other 
political force) triumph in Lebanon, and its strategy in Lebanon has 
consistently followed the principles of Realpolitik.  To paraphrase the 
dictum of Lord Pamertson, Syria has neither eternal allies nor perpetual 
enemies in Lebanon.24 
Although paradoxical, Shi’ite revolutionaries turned to Iran as a source of 
support.  Iran became an ideological inspiration to many Shi’ite groups that believed 
Khomeini’s rhetoric of the “Great Satan” had penetrated the Arab world.  Through 
Khomeini’s anti-Western rhetoric, many Shi’ite militants had the opportunity to use 
Islam as a means to wage war against the infidel.  Khomeini’s comments that wars 
between governments, specifically secular nations of the Gulf region and Iran, are not 
simply invasions, but rather rebellions against Islam, further exemplified the Lebanese 
Shi’ite identity.25  Hezbollah used Iran’s radicalized message of Islamic resistance, which 
struck a chord for other opposition-minded Muslims.  Furthermore, in a 1985 letter 
addressed to the “Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the world,” Hezbollah emphasized the 
Iranian Revolution as an inspiration of action:  
We address all the Arab and Islamic peoples to declare to them that the 
Muslim’s experience in Islamic Iran left no one any excuse since it proved 
beyond all doubt that bare chests motivated by faith are capable with 
God’s help of breaking the iron and oppression of tyrannical regimes…It 
is time to realize that all the Western ideas concerning man’s origin and 
nature cannot respond to guidedness and ignorance.26   
                                                 
23 Norton, Hezbollah, 23. 
24 Ibid., 35. 
25 Mackey, The Iranians, 319. 
26 Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shi’a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin: University 
of Texas Press, 1987), 183–84. 
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In Hezbollah’s worldview, resisting occupation was a legitimate duty in order to 
defend Islam and ultimately the Lebanese Shi’i identity.  Harik indicates the level 
ideological and cohesive effects of the Iranian revolution with the direct formation and 
conditioning of Hezbollah: 
These men, and others like them, suited Iran’s foreign policy requirements 
in terms of their ideological commitments and willingness to act upon 
them, as some had already demonstrated in the terrorist operations 
allegedly sponsored by the Islamic Republic in West Beirut.  These men 
and other committed Shiite fundamentalists who, after 1979, were swept 
up by the Iranian Revolution and shared its goals could be helped by 
Iran’s Revolutionary Guards to form an organizational structure and to 
cohere around a local leadership that would be able to exploit the 
opportunity for militant jihad being offered...Iran’s support for this group, 
which would eventually become Hezbollah, could deliver two important 
foreign policy goals: the capacity to fight Israel through a proxy, which 
allowed it direct entrance into the Middle East war/peace equation and the 
expansion of Shiite Islam’s influence in Lebanon through Hezbollah’s 
developing role there.27 
The strings of the puppeteer, entwined with political and religious ideologies and under a 
veneer of deniability, were solidified; Iran’s “Great Satan” had become “the mother of all 
malice” to Hezbollah.28  
3. Hezbollah’s Mobilization and Legitimization 
From the time that the Revolutionary Guards began to train Hezbollah guerilla 
fighters, in the 1980s, the violence for Hezbollah began.  The bombing of the U.S. 
Embassy in Beirut in April 1983 was often marked as the first catastrophic event to 
demonstrate Hezbollah’s capabilities.  However, where the veneer of deniability is 
evident is in the fact that, “Hezbollah has never admitted any involvement in these 
attacks and no concrete evidence has been presented by the United States government 
linking the fundamentalist group to them.”29  Though Iran may have been complicit in 
the attack, Hezbollah’s role is a bit murkier.  Another crucial element to Hezbollah’s 
                                                 
27 Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism, 39–40. 
28 Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 57. 
29 Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism, 65.   
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legitimization was the debut of its 1985 manifesto, the aforementioned “Downtrodden in 
Lebanon and in the world,” in which Hezbollah’s spokesperson, Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin, 
declared Hezbollah’s objectives.  Hezbollah’s three objectives included: “putting an end 
to any colonialist entity” in Lebanon, brining the Phalangists to justice for “the crimes 
they [had] perpetrated,” and the establishment of an Islamic regime in Lebanon.30 Along 
with the objectives, the booklet outlined Hezbollah’s political agenda, as well as its direct 
Iranian orientation:  
We, the sons of Hezbollah’s nation in Lebanon, whose vanguard God has 
given victory in Iran and which has established the nucleus of the world’s 
central Islamic state, abide by the orders of a single wise and just 
command currently embodied in the supreme exemplar of Ayatollah 
Khomeini.31   
During a time of extreme exultation created from a string of military successes, 
Hezbollah also used the booklet to address and justify its use of violence.  From the June 
1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847 to the dozens of kidnappings of foreigners, Hezbollah 
had established itself as a malevolent force, acting under the auspices of Iran.32 
Although Iran did not exercise direct control of the kidnappings, its 
revolutionary regime did exert strong ideological influence and was 
particularly effective at sowing the suspicion that Westerners in Lebanon 
were agents for imperialist Americans and Israelis.33  
Though the West viewed Hezbollah as fanatics and terrorists, the rhetoric of 
fierce ideological tenor of the document solidified Hezbollah’s power over the Lebanese 
Shi’ite community.  Norton writes:  
                                                 
30 Ted Dekker and Carl Medearis, Tea with Hezbollah: Sitting at the Enemies’ Table Our Journey 
through the Middle East (New York: Doubleday, 2010), 237. 
31 Jaber, Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance, 54. 
32 The highjacking of TWA Flight 847 was masterminded by Imad Mughniyah, linked to Hezbollah’s 
External Security Organization.  The highjacking was intended to be a brokerage between Israel for the 
release of 766 Lebanese prisoners held in Israel.   
33 Norton, Hezbollah, 73–4. 
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Imam Khomeini, the leader, has repeatedly stressed that America is the 
reason for all our catastrophes and the source of all malice.  By fighting it, 
we are only exercising our legitimate right to defend our Islam and the 
dignity of our nation.34   
Discussed thoroughly in Chapter III, Hezbollah framed the document to elicit 
national sympathy for a struggle over meaning and values; Hezbollah’s violence was to 
uphold the “dignity of [Lebanon].”  However, the violence was justified, both 
kidnapping, as a weapon, and airplane hijackings served Iran’s operations in three 
significant ways.  First, they demonstrated Hezbollah’s capabilities and intent; second, 
they caused the departure of many foreigners in Lebanon, a stated goal in the 1985 
document; third, as the political purposes of Iran were entwined with Hezbollah’s actions, 
Iran’s iron fist controlled Hezbollah’s violence without sanctions by the West.   
Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, the spiritual compass for Hezbollah, 
expressed concerns over the hijacking operations, which became a motivation to 
Hezbollah to disenfranchise from the radical policies of kidnapping and religious fervor.  
Fadlallah warned: “We must not get carried away by this method [of highjacking].  
Today you hijack, and tomorrow you are yourself the victim of highjack.’”35  To deaf 
ears, Fadlallah’s message “came up against a blank wall, because there is a mysterious 
force that is behind these actions.”36  Though Hezbollah would restructure its radical 
policies, the link to Iran remained the mysterious force.  
With Khomeini’s death in 1989, this charismatic symbol of the revolution 
was replaced by men of more modest views who now had to address the 
mundane but daunting challenges of restoring post-revolutionary Iran.  
The Iranian president Alik Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and the new Iranian 
leadership of the early 1990s moved to reorient their policy more toward 
the broader Shi’i community and Lebanon as a whole, distancing 
themselves from militias, at least for a few years.  Internecine fighting 
between Amal and Hezbollah had provoked a significant change of 
attitude in Tehran, where the bloodletting in Lebanon was viewed with 
disgust.  Because the vicious fighting between the two groups cost many 
civilian lives, Rafsanjani reacted sharply, pointedly condemning both sides 
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for their actions. But Iran was not merely outraged at the bloodshed in 
Lebanon, for 1990 marked the closing days of the Cold War, the 
assembling of an international coalition against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, 
and the long overdue end of the Lebanese civil war.  Thus Iran was 
adjusting to the new balance of power in the world in which U.S. power 
was without rival.37 
Embracing Iran’s change in worldview, Hezbollah began its restructuring campaign.  
While the 1989 Taif Accord proposed to change the imbalance of Lebanese politics, 
Hezbollah embraced both the political ramifications of the transference of opportune 
power and the right to legitimization as a resistance force.38 
4. Hezbollah’s Restructuring: Emerging From the Violence and Into 
Politics 
 Though Hezbollah realized that in order to maintain a legitimate presence in 
Lebanon while remaining loyal to Iran, the regional turmoil of the early and mid-1990s 
were imperative to Hezbollah’s restructuring and playing by the “rules of the game.”39  
Political compromise was seemingly the only option for Hezbollah to maintain popular 
support and representation.  Norton writes:  
Fadlallah argues that, because revolutionary transition to Islamic rule and 
an Islamic state was impossible in the diverse Lebanese society, gradual 
reformation was necessary.  And that, insisted Fadlallah, required 
participating in the political system.40   
 Not only did Hezbollah understand that political participation was a necessary 
step in revitalizing its image in Lebanon,  
‘The real change came in 1991,’ Timur Goksel recalled.  First of all I think 
they mainly improved their field security.  They had realised that they had 
allowed themselves in the past to become oversized, and if a guerrilla 
organisation is too big then it is easy to track.  The military  
 
                                                 
37 Norton, Hezbollah, 44–45. 
38 The Taif Accord justified the maintenance of Hezbollah’s armed forces and became known as 
“Islamic resistance” groups rather than militias.    
39 Norton, Hezbollah, 83.   
40 Norton, Hezbollah, 99.  In the 1992 elections, Hezbollah won twelve seats in the Lebanese 
parliament and routinely wins around 10 percent of all its parliamentary seats. 
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tactics used were of a professional caliber.  They included intelligence and 
reconnaissance.  Their attacks had all the elements and ingredients of 
military operations.41 
Hezbollah’s tactics evolved; rather than limiting its scale of destruction to guerrilla style 
tactics, Hezbollah embraced the art of both guerrilla warfare and conventional war.  Both 
strategies proved pivotal between 1996 and 2000, when Hezbollah engaged in fighting 
with Israel.  In what would become a tit-for-tat cycle of violence between Israeli soldiers 
and Hezbollah, Operation Grapes of Wrath proved to be the emergence of the modern 
perceptions of Hezbollah’s capabilities.   
This time would prove to be no different.  The offensive served to bring 
the people even closer to Hezbollah’s Islamic Resistance and they turned 
their wrath against the occupation instead.  It also reawakened a sense of 
bitterness against the West.  Muslims interpreted the Western powers’ lack 
of action as proof of further tacit collusion with Israel…Israel was once 
again getting away with its actions in Lebanon.42 
 Israel’s attempts to eliminate Hezbollah had caused an unintended effect: the 
cycle of violence in the once divided Lebanon created unity to a cause, and such unity 
was instilled by Hezbollah.  Lebanon’s former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri expressed the 
government’s growing tolerance of Hezbollah when he claimed that it was not the 
government’s duty to stop Hezbollah’s “resistance.”43  While diplomacy and negotiations 
continued to be breached, it became evident that Hezbollah was achieving more aims 
than Israel’s vision of the destruction of the organization.  In the wake of Operation 
Grapes of Wrath, provoked by a cease-fire agreement in April 1996, Hezbollah had 
victoriously won the political support that it had intended for in its restructuring 
campaign.  Jaber writes: 
The Americans’ argument…was that if Israel was to be condemned then 
Hezbollah should be condemned as well.  Lebanon objected to this on the 
basis that it could not allow a legitimate resistance to be treated in the 
same manner as a country launching the aggression; to allow Hezbollah to 
be condemned would set a precedent for the condemnation of any future 
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42 Ibid., 172. 
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resistance against Israel…The Lebanese mission’s argument was a 
remarkable recognition of Hezbollah’s legitimacy.  Prior to ‘Operation 
Accountability,’ [in 1993] the Lebanese government had disputed the 
merits of the Islamic Resistance…In the wake of ‘Operation Grapes of 
Wrath,’ Lebanon was prepared to defend Hezbollah’s right to exist before 
the world.44 
 Although paradoxical, from guerrilla warfare to conventional war, Hezbollah 
emerged from the violence a political and military victor.  The unprecedented outrage 
expressed by all faiths of Lebanon against Israel’s offensive was the sense of national 
unity at the hands of Hezbollah’s resistance.  Hezbollah understood the effects and 
causations of war and with a united Lebanon, with Hezbollah as the ultimate guidance, 
Iran’s foothold in the region was, for the first time, solidified.  In 2003, Lebanon’s former 
President, Emile Lahoud, expressed his stance on Hezbollah:  
For us Lebanese, and I can tell you a majority of Lebanese, Hezbollah is a 
national resistance movement [and] [i]f it wasn’t for them, we couldn’t 
have liberated our land.  And because of that, we have big esteem for the 
Hezbollah movement.45 
 In 2009, Hezbollah published a new manifesto in which the earlier religious 
rhetoric found in the 1985 document was nullified by the political and revolutionary 
agenda.  Hezbollah outlines its basic political principals in Chapter II: Israel is a threat to 
Lebanon and Hezbollah must keep arms to defend Lebanon; political sectarianism should 
be eliminated; and its opposition to federalism.46  Focusing extensively on Lebanon, 
Hezbollah grasped the very core of domestic policy in congruence with the Lebanese 
identity; to ensure a national unity, the new manifesto is the epitome of Hezbollah’s 
evolution. Jaber’s analysis has proven victorious: “[Iran’s] aim was to promote Hezbollah 
so that it became the sole Shiite Islamic force in the country, as a prelude to Iran’s final 
phase of replacing the Lebanese political system with an Islamic order.”47 
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C. ANALYSIS OF HEZBOLLAH’S OPERATIONS: THE VENEER OF 
DENIABILITY AND CREDIBILITY 
 Iran’s investment in Hezbollah, both monetary and through ideological 
dissemination, has created a masterful organization that has maneuvered itself into the 
Lebanese identity.  Where Hezbollah has found success in resisting Israeli occupation 
and the reconstruction of Lebanon, Iran has capitalized on Hezbollah’s popular support.  
Without acting as a state aggressor, Iran has managed to calculate the necessary buffer 
between both hostile and complaisant actions and diplomacy.  Cordesman and Kleiber 
argue that Hezbollah is Iran’s version of low-level operations whereby,  
Low-level operations that intimidate a Gulf State or other neighbor 
without making it react in hostile ways can also succeed, although they 
involve careful balance and judgment.  Simply building up military and 
security relations can provide both a defensive option and a potential 
threat to other powers without being a direct provocation.48   
As aforementioned, Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah is like a three-dimensional chess 
game; when Iran moves a piece (i.e., Hezbollah), the world, and the Gulf States, with 
more scrutiny, watch the actions of the piece, not the player.  Iran has captured the very 
essence of deniability.  Furthermore, Cordesman and Kleiber write:  
Sheer distance, and the tactical buffer caused by the need to bypass or 
overfly Arab states, gives Iran some freedom of action in supporting 
Hezbollah…This also allows Iran to build up its capabilities and influence 
by appearing to take the Arab side —although not if its efforts in nations 
like Lebanon provoke Arab states to see such actions as threatening their 
security or it provokes Israel to the point where its tenuous restraint turns 
into hostile action.49 
The strategic adeptness that Hezbollah provides Iran is also intrinsically related to the 
sheer force that Hezbollah can provide for the capabilities of Iran’s military power.   
No one can ignore the fact that Iran does have a large, if divided force 
structure…Its army has an active strength of around 350,000 men, 
although 220,000 are low-grade conscripts and its corps of technicians and 
noncommissioned officers is poorly trained and given limited initiative.  
Iranian training and doctrine have slowly improved over time, although 
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Iran has little practical experience with advanced command and control, 
targeting, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (IS&R), and 
electronic warfare capability…[The Iranian Army] is not…a modern 
maneuver force by any means.50 
Conclusively,  
Iran has been more conservative in modernizing its conventional military 
forces.  Iran has never rebuilt the level of conventional forces it had before 
its defeat in its war with Iraq in 1988.  Iran’s conventional military 
readiness, effectiveness, and capabilities have declined since the end of the 
Iran-Iraq War, and Iran has not been able to find a meaningful way to 
restore its conventional edge in the region.51   
Iran needs Hezbollah; the sheer demonstrations of Iran’s military forces exemplify 
Hezbollah’s necessity.   
 As aforementioned, the use of proxies also creates a distorted perception of the 
chain of command.  During Hezbollah’s hostage-taking campaign, the sheer deniability 
of Iran’s role became evident.  Jaber credits an expert’s explanation:   
The whole plan was designed in such a way that it would not be possible 
to recognise, identify or actually prove who the real brains behind such 
attacks were.  It was beyond any intelligence services.  This was not an 
individual group or an organisation which they could search for and 
eventually find.52   
Furthermore:   
The beauty of the design, if one can describe it as that, is that nearly a 
decade later the intelligence services are still blaming Hezbollah as if it 
was one individual person.  This is because no one yet has been able to 
come up with an accurate list of names or a break down as to who was 
behind what…and no one will ever be able to.53   
Iran has a scapegoat; Hezbollah is Iran’s mobilized political-agenda and Iran has 
mastered the politics of survival over the “Great Satan,” through strategic deniability.   
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One point critical to deniability is secrecy, and as demonstrated by the absolved chain of 
command during Hezbollah’s hostage campaign, Hezbollah maintains secrecy.  Baer 
writes:  
Even the Iranians were astonished by Hezbollah’s ability to keep a secret, 
a key to fighting any guerrilla war.  In 1996, when Hezbollah launched an 
offensive against the Israelis, the Iranians called Hezbollah’s secretary-
general Hassan Nasrallah to Tehran.  They wanted to be certain that 
Hezbollah fighters wouldn’t reveal Iran’s role.  Nasrallah reassured Iran 
that Hezbollah’s cadres would never betray Iran.  They would lie, cover 
up, obfuscate—whatever was necessary—to keep Iran’s involvement 
secret.54 
Ironically, foreign diplomats and heads of state are not negligent to Iran’s involvement, 
which adds to Iran’s credibility.  Baer’s perceptions of Hezbollah’s early campaigns of 
violence shed light on Iran’s deception: “It’s not that Hezbollah is doing the terrorism out 
of Lebanon.  They did not do the U.S. Embassy in 1983 or the Marines.  It was the 
Iranians.  It’s a political issue [in the U.S.] because the Israelis want the Americans to go 
after Hezbollah.”55  Furthermore:  
Asked whether Hezbollah’s attack was considered an act of terrorism, [US 
Ambassador Vincent Battle] said that it did “not fall within the rubric” of 
terrorism, since Hezbollah had gone after ‘combatant targets’ and not 
civilians.  That admission, a first from an American official, at last 
revealed that regardless of what the Party of God was doing in South 
Lebanon in terms of terrorist or resistance action, the United States of 
America wanted them out of business.56   
Hezbollah is therefore the exemplary political buffer that Iran needs.  In the politics of 
survival, it is easier to engage with an organization (i.e., organizational terrorism) than 
with an entire state (i.e., state terrorism).  Thus, it appears that Iran has truly mastered and 
manipulated “the rules of the game.” 
 However, the level of dependency is not one-sided; Hezbollah needs Iran.  “To 
deny the Iranian aid issued to Lebanon’s Hezbollah would be like denying that the sun 
provides light to the earth.  Who can deny such a thing’ says Sheikh Subhi Tufeili, 
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Hezbollah’s first leader.”57  In the brief re-emergence of fighting between Hezbollah and 
Israel, reports surfaced that indicated the level of direct support that the Revolutionary 
Guards had provided or modeled for Hezbollah.  Such logistical support includes: 
“Iranian engineers and technicians, and experts from North Korea who were brought in 
by Iranian diplomats;” 200 missiles-units “technicians and experts who were trained in 
Iran;” and “assistance from the Iranian Foreign and Intelligence ministries.”58  Though 
Iran’s investments have aided the success of Hezbollah’s ongoing resistance movements, 
this has also enhanced the credibility of Iran’s ability to use nonstate actors in 
disseminating its political agenda.  As Iran can benefit from a scapegoat, Hezbollah has 
security in the fact that it is sponsored by a foreign state; therefore, attacks against 
Hezbollah can have the same effects as attacks against a state.   
D. CONCLUSION 
 As Lebanon’s sentiments begin to favor Hezbollah and views of public perception 
idolize and adorn the resistance efforts achieved because of Hezbollah and its leaders, the 
United States, the “Great Satan,” denounces Hezbollah and the terms “terrorism” and 
“terrorists” are commonly used to describe the organization.  Jaber writes:  
Since the end of the Cold War, fear of Islamic militancy appears to have 
replaced the former dread of communism in the popular consciousness.  
Not only have Western governments fostered the climate of mistrust, but 
Arab regimes have also contributed in fear of the challenge which the 
Islamic trend poses to their legitimacy.59   
However, seemingly connected to the Hezbollah’s restructuring campaign, discussed 
further in Chapter III, is the fact that Hezbollah has transformed the outlook of Lebanon; 
popular awareness and support for the organization is solidified through all religious 
affiliations in Lebanon.  In the midst of Lebanon’s frequent Israeli destruction, Iran found  
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Hezbollah’s popular support as the necessity to extend its influence campaign.  Through 
funding of social services and revitalizing the Lebanese identity, Hezbollah has managed 
to “impose order where there was none before.”60  
 Though it is difficult to acquire any solid information about the extent of funds 
that Hezbollah receives from Iran, many reports suggest that it is in the tens of millions, 
annually; for war-torn Lebanon, reconstruction is the master guise under which Iran can 
spread its political and ideological agendas.  It no longer seems the forefront of political 
discussion to analyze Iran’s attempt to export its Islamic Revolution; where the analysis 
continues is in the fact that Iran has successfully manipulated a country (i.e., Lebanon) 
and its expansion of its capabilities for asymmetric warfare in the Gulf.  Iran’s “rules of 
the game” are opportunistic—to provoke a broader split between Arab nations and as 
Cordesman and Kleiber write, Iran has capitalized on “the region’s obsession with using 
history to produce self-inflicted wounds.”61  More poignantly: “Iran…incited a revolution 
in Lebanon building on a core of only a few hundred proxy fighters and co-opted clerics, 
who eventually turned half the country into an Iranian outpost.”62   
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III. FRAMING IRAN’S INFLUENCE CAMPAIGN: INFLUENCING 
FROM LEBANON 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Information framing is in essence a system of codes, whereby each code may 
differ significantly depending on the audience.  As all intricate systems in politics, 
information framing is a device in which the political message or ideology is presented in 
a manner in which the audience’s perceptions of the message will generate “vague 
feelings of anger and resentment into tangible, easy-to-define grievances.”63 Aslan 
continues:  
It can also connect local and global grievances that may have little or 
nothing to do with one another under a ‘master frame’ that allows a 
movement’s leaders to encompass the wider interests and diverse 
aspirations of their members.64   
In order for a framing process to generate success, states and organizations must “find 
consistency with deeply held cultural values.”65  Where Iran has the foundations for a 
successful campaign is the fact that Islam, the original “master plan” for Iran, is rich in 
narratives, symbols, and devout rituals; Iran can and has framed issues that have 
encouraged solidarity and transformed potential mobilization, behind a cause, into actual 
mobilization.  Furthermore, frames “represent interpretive schemata that offer a language 
and cognitive tools for making sense of experiences and events in the ‘world out 
there.’”66   
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William O. Beeman summarizes the importance of such codes: 
It is impossible for nations engaged in communication with each other not 
to engage in the use of tropes and figures of speech to characterize 
themselves and others.  Both metaphors and euphemism are part of the 
codes of communication used by political leaders to speak both to each 
other and to their own constituents.  The codes may differ significantly 
depending on the audience.  Such differences in codes can also imply a 
difference in the key of the message —the manner in which the statement 
is to be taken.67 
 Iran’s framing process is from two peripheries: Iran as a state, and through 
Hezbollah, the disseminator of Iran’s ideologies.  This chapter seeks to explore the tactics 
by which Iran frames its destabilization campaign and the level of reciprocity the Gulf 
region has to such frames.  From the perspective of Iranian leaders and from the 
perspective of Hezbollah’s framing strategy, this chapter will explain, in further detail, 
the necessity of Hezbollah to Iran.  Coupled with both aspects of information framing, 
Iran has demonstrated strengths in its abilities to mobilize support from citizens of the 
Gulf region while maintaining a threat to governmental emissaries.  As the final chapter 
will reveal, Iran’s framing process is the most lethal instrument in its destabilization 
campaign.   
B. IRAN: “THE GREAT SATAN” VS. “THE BAD MULLAHS”  
 As the Iranian Revolution charged that imperialism is a threat against the 
sovereignty of Islam, Iran has maintained a posture of anti-imperialism; but instead of 
capitalizing on subordination and obeisance, Iran focuses on the nation as a person 
metaphor, whereby Iran is not the belligerent but instead the prey. Iran’s campaign to 
destabilize the Gulf region is from a Cold War perspective: “us” vs. “them.”  Ironically, 
but particularly advantageous to Iran’s strategy, is the fact that it is using an approach of 
provocative rhetoric with empty gesture.  Where the United States focuses on seemingly 
the same strategy, characterizing Iranian rule and military strategy as irrational and 
hostile, Iran assumes the role as the victim.  In international settings, President Mahmoud 
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Ahmadinejad assumes a hostile position, but he does so in a way that allows him to shift 
the charge to reflect the faults of the United States.  In August 2010, Ahmadinejad 
warned, yet condemned, the United States: 
Let me clarify the outrageousness of the American-Zionist position. We in 
Iran are in the middle of two American armies, in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
and confronted by a wicked Zionist state armed with a hundred nuclear 
weapons, and an imperialist United States poised with thousands of 
deliverable nukes, yet these two criminal actors on the international stage 
want us to continue to submit to their hegemony and their nuclear 
monopolies. Imagine how terrified Americans would be if they lacked 
nuclear weapons and were threatened by armies from a powerful nuclear 
nation occupying both Canada and Mexico. That in every way is 
analogous to our situation. Of course, that does not mean Iran is seeking 
nuclear weapons. We seek only peaceful nuclear energy and, as 
signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, have been quite 
cooperative in permitting international inspectors to examine our 
facilities.68 
In one simple message, Ahmadinejad delivered a threat, but rebuked by framing the 
United States as the belligerent.  Secretary of State Hilary Clinton commented on Iran’s 
strategy: “Iran has a history of making confusing, contradictory, and inaccurate 
statements designed to convey the impression that it has adopted a flexible attitude…”69   
Flexibility, linked to deceit, is the very characteristic that allows Iran to avoid 
accountability, but remain credible to the potential threat. Such mired rhetoric allows Iran 
to maintain an offensive stance, but appear to have the capabilities to tackle “what-if” 
scenarios—this leaves Gulf state rulers, as well as the United States, to assess the 
credibility of “confusion” and “contradictions.”  Cordesman and Kleiber summate: 
Iran has developed a mix of think tanks, strategic spokespersons, and 
“dialogue” that involves an awkward mixture of professional apologists 
and extremists.  Iran has sometimes sent such individuals as a virtual 
“traveling circus” to other countries or meetings in Iran.  Such 
spokespersons, who somewhat distance themselves from the regime, then 
claim Iranian actions are misunderstood, grand bargains are at hand that  
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can resolve all differences, and Iran’s problems are the result of Western 
misunderstanding and a failure to listen, be “fair,” and accept a truce 
dialogue.70 
 However, it would be false to assume that Iran is an irrational and rogue state; the 
very nature of framing requires a degree of false perceptions and linguistic spins.  Baer 
writes:  
Iran has convinced its enemies that attacking it comes at too high a price.  
As the rhetoric picked up with the United States in 2007, Iran sent 
emissaries to all the Gulf states with one simple message: If the United 
States attacks us, we will destroy your oil facilities.71   
This warning also extends to GCC countries, because to conquer the “Iranian threat,” the 
United States has in essence, created a “regional cooperation against so-called Iranian 
expansion.”72  GCC rulers are cautious; though, for a different reason than what Western 
media often capitalizes on—Iran’s potential nuclear-threat.  Iran is a regional military-
threat, but more identifiable, cooperation amongst Gulf leaders is intrinsically related to 
the marginalization of Sunni power.  Zweiri analyzes: “[The marginalization of Sunni 
power] touches emotional, religious and historic chords and changes they [Arab leaders] 
don’t like…It’s a big emotional hurdle for the Sunnis in the region to accept.”73  
Furthermore,  
At the most senior level, King Abdullah of Jordan has warned of a “Shia 
crescent” “stretching from Iran all the way through Iraq to Syria and 
Lebanon,” and President Husni Mubarak has admitted that Iran “exerted 
strong influence” over Iraq’s majority Shia population and Shias living in 
other Arab countries.74   
It is therefore evident that Iran has framed two messages to different audiences: one, to 
the United States and the cooperative Gulf States, and the other to the populations of the 
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Gulf region. As Iran has framed a message of victimization and “misunderstandings” to 
Gulf leaders, it has used the same discourse to address the citizens of Arab countries.   
 “The Great Satan” is at the forefront of Iranian framing towards Gulf state 
populations.  Connotations of Islamic thought are imperative to understand the anti-
imperialism rhetoric that Iran elicits:  
No image could be more deeply evocative than the characterization of the 
United States as The Great Satan by Iran.  However, even this is subject to 
misunderstanding.  Satan is not merely a figure of evil in Islam.  He is a 
jinn created from fire, bright, beautiful, and jealous of humanity.  
Therefore, he tempts humankind to stray from God’s path.  In 
characterizing the United States in this way, Iranian revolutionaries were 
trying to emphasize the fact that America led Iran astray from its correct 
religious and spiritual path.75 
 Though sectarian lines polarize the politics in the Islamic world, at which Iran 
aims to divide even further, the fact remains that all Muslims have a united vision of 
“Satan.”  Therefore, as Iran’s rhetoric espouses the United States in such a context, 
Sunnis are included in the ideological framing process.  Iran has manifested a cause to 
include the wider interests of Islamic values.  Ahmadinejad is viewed as a hero of the 
oppressed to much of the Gulf populations; his demonization of the United States and 
Israel appeal to Muslim masses.76  While the international community discusses the 
ramifications of the Iranian nuclear threat, the masses discuss Israel and Palestinian 
rights.  Dan Morrison poignantly writes:  
With his persistent jabs at America, Israel and the West, his apparent drive 
for a nuclear bomb and his workingman’s wardrobe of off-the-rack suits, 
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has captured the Arab street… 
“He has the courage to stand up to America and Israel.  Which other 
leader in the world is doing that?” said Ahmed Yassin.77   
To the civilians in the Gulf region, Ahmadinejad has framed the issue to address 
oppression and extend issues on human rights.  Shibley Telhami commented: “There is a 
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hunger for leadership in the Arab world, a hunger for change…Iran is reaping the 
benefit.”78  While denying the Nazi Holocaust’s realities, Ahmadinejad’s excessive 
rhetoric has struck a chord with Arabs, demonstrating the wider interests of mobilization.  
Mahmoud Ali, a medical student in Cairo, remarked  
I like him [Ahmadinejad] a lot…He’s trying to protect himself and his 
nation from the dangers around him.  He makes me feel proud.  He’s a 
symbol of Islam.  He seems the only person capable of taking a stand 
against Israel and the West.  Unfortunately, Egypt has gotten too 
comfortable with Washington.79 
 However, Iran’s information framing does not come without a critical strategic-
flaw: 
In Iran…communication tends toward hierarchical skewing.  It is 
frequently difficult for Iranians to maintain egalitarian discourse, 
particularly in the public arena.  Therefore, speakers adopt the somewhat 
unusual strategy of using self-lowering forms in conjunction with other-
raising forms, denigrating one’s self while elevating one’s interaction 
partner.  When both parties do this simultaneously, the communication 
takes on a flavor highly characteristic of Iranian life.  In the internal 
political arena, hierarchy is largely assumed.  However, in dealing with 
foreign powers, such as the United States, Iran expects to be treated as an 
equal.80 
Furthermore, “In a simple dichotomy, Iran alternates between revolutionary idealism and 
political realism.  Theses oscillations breed discontinuity, increase vulnerability and limit 
diplomacy to tactical interactions.”81 
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C. HEZBOLLAH: FRAMING FROM LEBANON 
 Information framing requires strategies, and as demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, Iran not only needs Hezbollah as a buffer, but it needs Hezbollah to frame Iran’s 
influence campaign.  Aslan writes:  
These so-called ‘frame alignment techniques’ allow social movements…to 
more easily create in-groups and out-groups.  They help identify and, 
more important, vilify the enemy.  They can even assist movement leaders 
in marking neutral bystanders as either sympathetic or antagonistic to the 
movement’s cause, all with the aim of compelling people to join the 
movement and do something about their grievance.  In short, framing 
helps members of a social movement make the difficult transition from 
collective identity to a collective action.82   
In order to understand the full extent of Hezbollah’s information-framing campaign, the 
topic of social movement theory (SMT) must first be presented.83  Social movement 
theory is in essence the very context in which Hezbollah is able to maximize its frames.  
Included in the variables of SMT analysis is the framing process of the organization.  At 
the very core of a social movement, the framing process allows the construction of 
meaning behind mobilized support.  Wiktorowicz writes: “…movements must articulate 
and disseminate frameworks of understanding that resonate with potential participants 
and broader publics to elicit collective action.”84 
 As all Islamic movements have capitalized on cultural and value frames, 
Hezbollah has successfully mobilized support in numerous ways.  The most predominant 
and perhaps effective means of popular support is Hezbollah’s use of cultural framing.  
Robinson writes: “To effectively popularize its ideology, a social movement must be able 
to provide clear summations of its ideology that resonate with its target audience.”85  As 
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an Islamic organization, Hezbollah has relative ease addressing Islamic ideologies, thus 
furthering its strategic framework.  However, most descriptions and theoretical analysis 
of Hezbollah’s framing strategies fail to address the fluency that the organization has in 
framing issues outside of the diverse perceptions present in political Islam.  Emmanuel 
Karagiannis’ article on Hezbollah as a social movement addresses the successes of the 
organization’s use of framing theory by the use of three processes: diagnostic framing, 
prognostic framing, and motivational framing.86  Diagnostic framing is the same 
discourse as the political opportunity structure, whereby Hezbollah has identified the 
condition of Israeli oppression as problematic; the injustice frame (i.e., Israeli occupation 
in Lebanon) is the mode of Hezbollah’s target strategy.  Rather than defining Israel’s 
occupation as a battle between Islam and Judaism, Hezbollah was able to achieve and 
frame a common ideology.  In the press conference on Freedom Day, Secretary General 
of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, exemplifies Hezbollah’s strategic framing: 
Regarding the possibility of war with an enemy [Israel] whose nature is 
aggression and treachery; an enemy that is thirsty for blood —and these 
are not speeches and poetry, but facts that we in the Arab World have been 
seeing for 60 years —no one can say that Lebanon is safe.87   
Nasrallah does not specifically address the Muslim population; rather, he identifies Arab 
World and Lebanon, as a whole.  Israel is identified as an expansionist state against the 
people of Lebanon—not identifiable by religious affiliation but rather a common 
ideology.   
 Parallel to Hezbollah’s restructuring campaign and the modification of its political 
methodology, Hezbollah transformed the diagnostic frames to emphasize the “unfairness” 
of the Lebanese political system.  In its 1992 Election Programme, Hezbollah emphasized 
the imperative cooperation  
with other devoted parties in order to complete the necessary steps 
towards the achievement of full liberation, the forging of internal peace on 
the basis of political concord that is furthest as could be from abominable 
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sectarian biases or narrow confessional discriminations…maintaining 
devotion in all actions or follow-ups undertaken and utmost concern for 
the rights of citizens, their support, defence of their land, and safeguard of 
their pride and dignity.88   
However, in order to maintain the mass support of Shi’ites, Hezbollah has also been 
critical towards the United States. As aforementioned in the previous chapter, 
Hezbollah’s narrative is much like Iran’s: the United States “conspires” and remains “the 
greatest Satan of all.”89 
 The second process by which Hezbollah has framed issues is through prognostic 
framing.  According to Karagiannis’ research, prognostic framing offers the solutions to 
the problems identified in diagnostic framing.90  Following the Iranian Revolution’s 
model of an ideal and utopian Islamic-state, Hezbollah has offered much of the same 
propositions.91  Therefore, popular support by Muslims is almost recognizably 
achievable; Hezbollah has established a purpose behind its political endeavors, whereby 
Shi’ite and Sunni Muslims can identify with a singular cause.  However, as Karagiannis 
further recognizes, in the early 1990s, Hezbollah began to refrain from identifying a pan-
Islamic cause.  The organization changed its rhetoric to focus on the liberalization of all 
Lebanese; Karagiannis writes: “Following the end of the Lebanese civil war, Hizballah 
has maintained the role of a vanguard party, fighting for the rights of the ‘oppressed.’”92  
It can be concluded that Hezbollah identifies the “oppressed” or has had rhetorical gains 
with those who are from all social classes and religious affiliations.  By focusing on the 
broader population of Lebanon, Hezbollah has supported a pluralistic system where 
justice is the singular cause.  Therefore, Hezbollah’s once divine solution, directed at 
Muslims, has now shifted focus to offer divine solutions for Lebanese problems.  
Hezbollah has arguably achieved the greatest amount of popular support by offering 
solutions that are broad in the scope of audience.  Harik writes:  
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Hassan Nasrallah explained to me once that…a pillar in our movement is 
the need to respect others, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, and to forge 
the relations with them on a Koranic, moral basis.  As Imam Ali said, 
“There are two kinds of people; either a brother in religion or a peer in 
morality—either a brother in Islam or an equal in humanity.”93 
 The third process by which Hezbollah has framed issues is through motivational 
framing.  Karagiannis argues that Hezbollah has been the most successful in motivational 
framing, because the organization has succeeded in gaining popular support from both its 
“hard-core Shia constituency” and its “expanding non-Shia audience.”  As 
aforementioned, Hezbollah has recently identified causes that are directed at human 
nature: fairness, equality, and justice.  Although many scholars often identify Hezbollah 
as a sectarian organization, Nasrallah has attempted, and successfully achieved, to 
persuade non-Shia followers.  On August 27, 2006, following the UN-mandated ceasefire 
that ended the Lebanese-Israeli war, Nasrallah addressed the population:  
…Israel has ambitions to rule within the framework of the new Middle 
East.  Today, Hezbollah, along with its friends and allies, is the first 
defender of genuine sovereignty, genuine independence, and genuine 
freedom —and I add to them national dignity, honor, and pride.94   
Nasrallah’s emphasis on non-sectarian rhetoric has stressed the values of Hezbollah’s 
Lebanese character; therefore, the social movement characteristics that define Hezbollah 
are gaining popular support through the population’s identification of national appeal. 
 Hezbollah’s motivational-framing process includes one of the most strategic links 
to Iran: social services.  Hezbollah has dominated the public sphere with its involvement 
in providing social services to Lebanon’s population: 
Hezbollah maintains that the lack of government spending, coupled with 
the long policy of neglect, left it with no choice but to tackle the situation 
itself.  With Iran’s help, it embarked on an ambitious enterprise to build an 
entire social welfare structure for the Shiite community.  Iran saw the 
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and channeled millions of dollars worth of aid and financial assistance to 
Hezbollah…[in order to] secure the allegiance of the Shiite population to 
Hezbollah and its Iranian mentors.95 
Although deeply rooted in the political opportunity structure, following the 2006 
Lebanon War, Hezbollah seemingly emerged as a more powerful entity than government 
officials when the population demanded financial support.  Lebanon’s views of the 
“corrupt and unresponsive political system” were realized when Hezbollah distributed 
“$12,000 payments to each family made homeless by the war.”96  No longer was 
Hezbollah viewed as a Shi’ite based organization; when the people demanded retribution 
from the government, Hezbollah provided the necessary mobilization.  Furthermore, 
Karagiannis argues that Hezbollah has increased its support in the Arab world, thus 
legitimizing the organization as a national liberation movement, because it provides 
social services such as hospitals, schools, orphanages, and a television station.97  
Hezbollah’s interests in social services demonstrate the organization’s strength; providing 
invaluable support to all faiths, Hezbollah is able to generate durability and loyalty with 
its followers.  Ken Silverstein addresses Hezbollah’s outreach to all Lebanese citizens: 
Hezbollah offers an array of social services to its constituents that include 
construction companies, schools, hospitals, dispensaries, and micro-
finance initiatives (notably al-Qard al-Hasan, literally the “good loan,” 
which began making loans in 1984 and offers about 750 small loans a 
month).  These tend to be located in predominantly Shiite areas, but some 
serve anyone requesting help.  Hezbollah hospital and clinic staff also treat 
all walk-in patients, regardless of political views or their sect, for only a 
small fee.98   
When identifying what causations exist in Hezbollah’s support, it is fundamental 
to address the fact that ideologies aside, the organization offers support for an entire 
population and when professionals, working in Hezbollah’s service sector, depend on  
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their livelihood from the organization, further political support is established.  Therefore, 
it is problematic to assume that Hezbollah’s popularity is based on Islamic 
fundamentalism.   
 Similar to Iran’s predicament with the United States’ framing towards the 
organization, Hezbollah has found use of the media to present a new look to “the Iranian-
backed terrorists.”99  Such coverage of Israeli attacks, daily activities of Hezbollah’s 
parliamentarians, and sermons and speeches of its leaders, has exploited the use of the 
motivational frame.  Harik summates: 
This television coverage provided a contrasting image to that put forward 
by America and Israel and made it difficult to insinuate that Hezbollah 
was being shoved down Lebanon’s throat by Syria or was merely 
following Iran’s orders.  It also went a long way toward immunizing 
Hezbollah’s jihad from the American claim that the Party of God was no 
different than any other fundamentalist group on the terrorist list to be 
sidelined or eliminated sometime later.  By autumn, 2001, Hezbollah’s 
strongest detractors had to acknowledge the party’s socio-political 
contributions to Lebanese life.100 
 Lastly, and most crucial to Hezbollah’s growth in popular support has been what 
Kariagiannis calls the “Master Frame.”  Karagiannis writes: “It seems that the Party of 
God has adopted two different master frames, choosing one or another to approach the 
particular audience it is addressing.”101  The first master frame is pan-Islamism; such 
acceptance of a master frame can rapidly change the public’s perception of regional 
political-stability.  Again, it can be considered pan-Islamism is deeply ingrained in the 
fabrics of modern-resistance theology; however, in general, pan-Islamism has come to 
represent the utopian Islamic state that Hezbollah has espoused in prognostic framing.  
The second master frame is anti-globalization.102  Such a frame is perhaps the most 
critical in explaining the growing support of Hezbollah, because the organization has 
“framed itself as part of the wider antiglobalization movement.”103  Hezbollah has 
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essentially claimed legitimacy in its collective action by adopting an anti-globalization 
platform.  Although it is a loaded argument, Hezbollah shares the same ideologies that 
many political parties, trade unions, and leftist intellectuals share.  In 2004, Hezbollah 
participated in the conference entitled ‘Where Next for the Global Anti-War and Anti-
Globalization Movements.’ Among numerous representatives and organizations from the 
Arab world, other nations with considerably more international clout on the subject 
participated, including: France, Germany, England, the United States, and Spain, among 
others.104  Abdel-Halim Fadlallah, vice president of Beirut’s Center for Strategic Studies, 
a Hezbollah-affiliated center, commented: “Hezbollah succeeded in incorporating the 
idea of resistance as part of the international anti-globalization movements.”105  Fadlallah 
continued: “Through our contacts with these groups, we have managed to challenge the 
idea that Hezbollah is a dogmatic terrorist Islamist organization and convince part of the 
international left that we can be a strong partner.”  It has appeared that what was once 
illogical, due to significant ideological differences, Hezbollah has engaged in 
communicative outreach to organizations in countries that consider Hezbollah a terrorist 
organization; yet, domestically, such organizations would be identified as trade unions or 
NGOs.  Hezbollah has therefore achieved pragmatic and realistic success beyond the 
boundaries of the Arab world. 
 As Karagiannis defines the frames of the organization, Harik’s analysis delves 
deeper into the mind and the frames of Nasrallah.  Harik claims that Nasrallah has 
exploited ideological ambiguities and mastered the art of addressing multiple audiences: 
Looking more closely at this ideological ambiguity as an important 
strategy to broaden support, we see that Hassan Nasrallah…actually uses 
four different contexts or ‘frames’ in presenting his ideas about 
Hezbollah’s struggle against the Israelis, choosing one or another to suit 
the particular audience he is addressing.  For instance, when speaking at a 
rally in the dahiyeh where the gathering is mainly Shiites and most are  
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likely to be partisans, jihad is spoken of as a sacred religious duty that 
transcends all other aims.  In this context the Israelis are referred to as 
infidels and heretics to be drive off Muslim soil… 
On the other hand, when addressing a wider Lebanese audience of mixed 
faiths, Nasrallah presents jihad in nationalistic terms—as a patriotic duty 
to liberate the homeland and drive the Israelis out of Lebanon.  In this 
context, Hezbollah represents the Lebanese people who are ‘all resisting 
the enemy.’ 
A third frame of reference used in the Hezbollah leader’s discourse is 
trotted out when the target group is more likely to respond to an Arab 
nationalist context than any other…Jihad is placed in yet another context 
when Nasrallah addresses an international or global audience, as he often 
does on broadcasts by his organization’s international television channel, 
al-Manar…Here he expresses the idea of his organization’s jihad as an 
internationally recognized right enjoyed by all peoples whose countries 
are illegally occupied.106 
In the context of the entire social movement theory and framing campaign, Harik 
demonstrates the need to address fundamental steps necessary to identify the causes of 
popular support when she asks, “Does a common and fervently believed faith—in this 
case, Islam—lead to the adoption of a single ideology and a common goal and 
practice?”107  As demonstrated, regardless of faith, Hezbollah has achieved popular 
support while maintaining a single ideology and common goal intrinsically linked to Iran. 
D. ANALYSIS: IS IRAN’S FRAMING CAMPAIGN WORKING? 
 The difficulties in assessing the level of reciprocity towards Iran’s framing 
campaign, from both the governmental-state perspective and through Hezbollah, stem 
from the fact that human nature has a fleeting character.  As GCC leaders may appear to 
be cooperative and united against Iran, day-to-day strategies change; similarly, as the 
populations of the Gulf region may express support of Hezbollah, what system exists to 
gauge the level of reciprocity from one action to the next?  Iran may in fact only be a 
source of logistical and political opportunity, but public data will not elicit such 
information.  Furthermore, public data is a debatable source of analysis; through the 
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methodologies, polling surveys may elicit uncharacteristic responses.  As analysts argue 
certain appeals based on polling data, it becomes evident that biased views become the 
trend.  Despite the fact that public data is debatable, there are significant indications that 
Iran’s destabilization campaign is working. 
1. Iran: The Nation, As a Person Metaphor 
Iran has already demonstrated success in its destabilization campaign with the 
mobilization and legitimate roll of Hezbollah.  However, further credible is the fact that:  
…Iran’s growing influence over the Palestinians is indisputable.  
According to a 2007 Pew Research poll, 55 percent of Palestinians have a 
favorable opinion of Iran.  Forty-seven percent have a favorable opinion of 
President Ahmadinejad versus 40 percent who don’t.  (Keep in mind the 
poll was taken at a time when Ahmadinejad’s public statements were 
alarming almost everyone in the Middle East, including Iranians).  Fifty-
eight percent of Palestinians support Iran’s development of a nuclear 
bomb, making the Palestinians the only Arabs who do.108 
In terms of information framing, few articles specifically address Iran’s use of 
issue framing.  However, in an analysis of receptions to Iran’s nuclear program, analysts 
seemingly conclude that Iran is in fact successful in its attempt to weaken regimes.  
Digby Lidstone writes:  
The [survey by YouGov, commissioned by Qatar’s Doha Debates], which 
surveyed more than 1,000 people in 18 Arab countries last month, found 
that most see Iran as a bigger threat to security than Israel, with a third 
believing Iran is just as likely as Israel to target Arab countries.109    
Lidstone’s argument depends on the polling survey as the basis for his argument: Iran is 
addressing Arab countries with the appeal that Western nations are turning a blind eye, 
whereby Iran’s appeals to Gulf States are directed more towards driving wedges between 
those nations that support the U.S. or Western influence.110  Lidstone’s assessment is 
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seemingly correct, given the data available.111  Lidstone further addresses the fact that a 
majority of Arab countries believe that Iran’s intention to build a nuclear bomb is based 
on the intent to assert its authority regionally.112  Lidstone’s assessment of the public data 
presents a strong argument that Iran is successfully intimidating Gulf States.  
Furthermore, Lidstone analyzes the data based on region and suggests that because 
certain countries have better relations with Iran, Iran is successfully playing on the 
differences.113  Lidstone seemingly addresses the overall concern when he cites Mustafa 
Alani, a security analyst at the Gulf Research Centre in Dubai, “…the six Arab countries 
of the Gulf Co-operation Council do not have a unified strategy towards Iran.”114  
Arguably, such a lack of unified strategy indicates that Iran’s information framing is 
successfully driving wedges between nations. 
 Further evidence indicates Jordanian, Egyptian, and Moroccan support, all of 
which are Sunni states:  
…in a 2007 Pew Research poll, 46 percent of Jordanians said they looked 
at the country positively…Forty percent of Egyptians look at Iran 
favorably…And then there’s Sunni Morocco, where 42 percent of poll 
respondents back Iran, and 16 percent don’t.115  
What is seemingly remarkable is the fact that, in context, all three states who have strong 
Sunni ties and have, throughout history, shown discords that are deeply hostile to 
Shi’ites, should have rejected outright anything to do with Iran.  Such results exemplify 
the wedge that Iran has driven between the ideologies of Gulf-region governments and 
the populous.  
 Though Iran has found marginal success in its destabilization campaign, 
Ahmadinejad’s framing has been at the forefront of internal backlash.  Most recently, in 
August 2010, Ahmadinejad came under fire for declaring that the “bogeyman snatched 
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the boob,” in context to the United States’ ongoing threats and allegations against Iran.116  
As aforementioned, Ahmadinejad is not wary to use excessive speech, and perhaps this is 
the very reason that Arabs have found resolve in him.  However, response to 
Ahmadinejad’s crude references is indicative of the growing criticism by Iranians and 
political advocates.  Golnaz Esfandiari writes: 
There are signs, however, that Ahmadinejad might now be facing a 
backlash over his linguistic approach. In a first, judiciary chief Sadegh 
Larijani, a senior conservative member of the Iranian establishment, on 
August 8 publicly lambasted Ahmadinejad over his language.  
"As a citizen of this country I expect the language and the rhetoric the 
president employs in his speech to be impressive, well-founded, mature, 
and fair. What sort of wording is this: 'Let him fill up to the point of 
bursting' or, 'Let him have it, he will feel the pain,'" Larijani asked, noting 
that he had brought the issue up with the president personally many times.  
Presidential adviser Ali Akbar Javanfekr has rejected Larijani's criticism 
in a post on his personal blog. "Ahmadinejad, with the same language that 
has been criticized by Larijani, is alone fighting for the rights of the 
Iranian people and it's no secret to anyone that his language is bothering 
the arrogant power and despotic [regimes] and selfish people," he wrote, 
adding that "grateful" citizens have praised and commended 
Ahmadinejad's language.117 
 Contrary to Larijani’s conclusion, Ahmadinejad has found an audience that 
accepts his crude rhetoric; in essence, it is a strategy to mobilize support by the “common 
man.”  Esfandiari further addresses such a strategy in an interview with Faraj Sarkouhi, 
an exiled journalist and writer:  
The language that is being used is simple language, language that relies on 
the logic of force.  It’s patriarchal language.  It gives the right to power; 
not brain power, but there’s a greater stress on physical power.118   
Ahmadinejad’s excessive rhetoric, often crude and coarse, has struck a chord with the 
masses—it is deliberate and successful. 
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2. Hezbollah: Iran, As a Nation Metaphor 
 It is without debate that Hezbollah has found success in its information campaign.  
However, without the political and ideological foundations for Hezbollah’s campaign, 
Iran would be without millions of constituents.  Baer poignantly addresses the very cause 
of success for Hezbollah’s campaign, in relation to Iran’s gain: 
It’s obvious why Iran is succeeding.  If you’re a poor baker in Beirut’s 
southern suburbs, furious about the fact your country is being occupied 
and looted by foreigners, whom are you more likely to throw your weight 
behind?  Fat, self-indulgent Saudis who haven’t fought a day for people 
like you?  Or Iran’s proxy, Hassan Nasrallah, who obeys Islam’s 
antisumptuary laws, living in a small, shabby apartment like everyone 
else, eating simply, sitting humbly on the floor when he receives a guest, 
and working to keep Hezbollah free of corruption?  For Lebanon, this kind 
of leadership has been a seismic shift, especially since Lebanon has 
historically been one of the most corrupt places on Earth.119 
The Lebanese population has identified with a cause, and further scholarly analyses and 
interviews reveal the same patterns of thought: “not affiliated, but…cannot deny them 
their achievements”; “we, as a people”; “regardless of our religion and sects…are behind 
the Resistance.”120  Hezbollah has succeeded to mobilize a common ideology.  The most 
recent data poll indicates a striking point:  
A 2008 Zogby poll showed that among Arabs, the three most popular 
leaders in the Middle East are non-Sunnis: the Shia Hezbollah leader, 
Hassan Nasrallah; the Alawite resident of Syria, Bashar al-Assad; and the 
Shia Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  And, a 2008 poll 
conducted by the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development and the 
University of Maryland revealed that support for Nasrallah is growing.121 
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Not only does the data reveal the shift in power from Sunni Islam to Shi’ite Islam, it is 
interesting to note that “three most popular leaders” are all working together with the 
same goals and policy strategies; furthermore, both Ahmadinejad and al-Assad are using 
Hezbollah as a proxy. 
 It would seem imperative that the threat to Sunni power would elicit hostility by 
the Arab nations; however, in 1998, Lebanon, 
signed an agreement with other Arab states that distinguished between 
terrorism and armed combat against foreign occupation and that the treaty 
holds its signatories responsible for supporting and defending resistance 
organizations against accusations of terrorism.  That treaty states that three 
features characterize a resistance force: a distinctive ideology; the fact that 
its militant activities take place only within national border; and that its 
attacks are aimed exclusively at military targets.  These characteristics, the 
report stated, fully described Lebanon’s national resistance.122 
Though Arab nations have seemingly identified the legitimacy of Hezbollah as a 
resistance force, the discourse against Hezbollah is justified by the role of Iran.  In 2007, 
Saudi Arabia and other GCC states drafted to provide billions of dollars in economic aid 
to Lebanon, in an effort to counter Iranian aid to Hezbollah.123  Indicative of the paradox 
that GCC states face is the fact that they feel threatened by the Iranian nuclear project and 
the potential shift in the balance of power; yet, they regard Hezbollah as a “resistance.”  
Perhaps this is part of the larger Iranian strategy of destabilization. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Jerome Corsi, a Bush administration supporter, penned a book titled Atomic Iran, 
whereby he presents cataclysmic scenarios of total annihilation of the United States and 
Israel by Iran.  In the most poignant demonstration of the nature in which Iran has been 
portrayed by the United States for decades is when Corsi writes: “What has emerged as a 
more serious threat, especially with the mad mullahs going nuclear, is what is known as 
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the improvised nuclear device.”124  Corsi continues with a scenario of total destruction of 
New York and describes a fantasy atomic explosion and as Beeman comments, Corsi has 
created “mayhem that has never actually occurred.”125 
As Beeman indicates, the United States has created scenarios of mayhem and 
framed Iran as an irrational state time and time again.   
War on Terror…ha[s] been deliberately imbued with cosmic 
significance…When the secretary of the army, Pete Geren, explicitly 
defines the war in Iraq as a battle between America and “radical Islam” 
during a commencement speech at West Point, or when the commander in 
chief of the armed forces declares that God instructed him to remove al-
Qa’ida from Afghanistan and to strike at Saddam Hussein in Iraq, as the 
Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz reported Bush as saying in 2003, it is difficult 
to imagine how these young, pious and “shaken” soldiers could 
understand their military mission in any way other than as part of a new 
crusade—a cosmic war between the forces of good (us) and evil (them).126 
Consequently, the United States has created the opportunity for Iran to succeed in its 
destabilization campaign.  Iran is not the only entity to frame the “us” vs. “them” 
metaphor, and as analysts throughout all spheres of the international community have 
indicated, perhaps the “real” framing is from the perspective of the United States.  
Exemplary of indicative framing by the United States towards Iran is presented in an 
editorial by Debbie Hamilton.127  Hamilton assesses the evaluation of media on the 
possibility of joint talks between the United States and Iran in 2006: 
There’s some variance this morning in coverage of Iran’s response to the 
U.S. proposal for direct nuclear talks.  The coverage ranges from 
“welcomed…but rebuffed” to “spurned”—with a later “welcomed, but” 
mention—to just a spurning… 
Associated Press: “Iran’s foreign minister on Thursday welcomed direct 
talks with Washington on his country’s disputed nuclear program but 
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rebuffed a U.S. proposal that Tehran must suspend uranium enrichment as 
a condition, state-run television reported.” 
Reuters: “Iran on Thursday spurned a U.S. offer of direct talks on its 
nuclear program as major world powers sought agreement on incentives to 
coax it to scrap potentially weapons-related atomic work.” 
IRNA: “Iranian Foreign Minister Manochehr Mottaki said here Thursday 
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s latest remarks presented no 
‘new and rational solution’ to Iran’s nuclear case.”128 
Indicative of the long pedigree of the United States’ villainization of Iran, Hamilton 
demonstrates the effects of Western media.  Similarly, as Beeman’s novel presents, the 
United States essentially creates the situations for Iran to use to its own advantage.  
Kayhan Barzegar concludes:  
The prevailing view in the United States is that Ahmadinejad’s foreign 
policy and Iran’s increasing presence in the region has been offensive, 
expansionist, opportunistic, and often ideological.  Though Iran has 
occasionally taken advantage of new opportunities, these characterizations 
have been exaggerated in the United States.129   
The United States has aptly created “new opportunities” for Iran. The clash 
between civilizations, according to Samuel P. Huntington, will dominate the new era in 
world politics.130  However, in a more dangerous context, Iran has created the 
foundations for a potential clash within Islam.  Ideologies have become far more 
dangerous than actual politics and where Iran will triumph is when Iran’s opportunities 
create a role in which the idea of a Shi’ite crescent is paired with proxies.  As Mahmoud 
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realm of its borders.  As the people turn to Iran for moral support and guidance, 





 If Western powers continue to view Iran as an irrational and rogue state, Iran’s 
influence campaign will have irreparable consequences.  Through Hezbollah, Iran has 
managed to mobilize Lebanon; consequently, analysts are beginning to see Iranian 
dissemination in Iraq.  In an undisguised warning, Baer claims, “Iraq is lost.  Iran won 
it.”131  Baer advances his warning by assimilating the connection between Lebanon and 
Iraq:  
The Iranians know exactly what they have to do in Iraq.  They wrote the 
template in Lebanon, where they learned how to manage chaos, to create 
order where there was none before.  And they know there’s nothing the 
United States can do to stop them from doing the same in Iraq.  The U.S. 
ambassador in Baghdad, Ryan Crocker, called it Iran’s “Lebanization” of 
Iraq.132   
Analyzing Baer’s conclusion, it is difficult to argue against.  The sectarian ideologies that 
divide Shi’ites and Sunnis, and more conclusively the nationalist fragmentation between 
Iran and Iraq, have proved to be an illogical assumption for strategies in Iraq.  Suzanne 
Maloney maintains that, 
[i]nstead of generating a liberal, secular democracy whose reverberations 
would drive out Iran’s clerical oligarchs, the disastrous Bush policies 
fostered a sectarian Iraq that has helped empower Iranian hardliners. 
Rather than serving as an anchor for a new era of stability and American 
preeminence in the Persian Gulf, the new Iraq represents a strategic black 
hole, bleeding Washington of military resources and political influence 
while extending Iran’s primacy among its neighbors.133   
What conclusion should one draw from Baer and Maloney’s warnings?  Iran does not 
need nuclear weapons, nor regular troops to destabilize the Gulf region—Iran only needs 
“proxies, money, and commerce.”134 
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A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
When President Barack Obama took office, he was determined to chart a new 
diplomatic approach with Iran.  As Obama described, his approach was “tough-minded 
diplomacy,” with the intent that opening diplomacy with Iran would enhance the United 
States’ leverage, whereby the United States would have adequate control over curtailing 
Iran’s nuclear program.  Obama began his campaign to open talks with Iran by 
broadcasting a celebratory message on Iran’s New Year.  Maloney notes that Obama’s 
language was crucial in setting the stage for opening the door on diplomacy with Iran; as 
a result of the wide circulation and positive reception in Iran, diplomatic talks appeared to 
be possible.135  It appeared as though “The Great Satan” resistance was finally null.   
However, following the highly disputed presidential elections in Iran, Washington 
found little to no headroom to continue with its diplomatic approach.  Demonstrations in 
Iran created instability within the government, and the United States struggled to respond 
effectively.  Diplomacy remained the default position; however, the United States 
“largely presumed its failure and leapfrogged to focus on prospects for punitive measures 
to pressure Iran.”136   
The United States’ expectations for a quick and durable resolution with Iran have 
been significantly supported by GCC members.  More specifically, the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) is critically vulnerable to Iran’s military capabilities, economic 
shortfalls, and exportation of radical Islam. During multiple Emirates Center for Strategic 
Studies and Research (ECSSR) conferences, officials and intellectuals of the GCC 
offered similar recommendations to mitigate confrontations with Iran.  Such 
recommendations include the following: joint environments, deployability and logistics, 
new technology, interoperability and internal partnerships, plans for development, and 
regional partnerships.137  According to General Sir Charles Guthrie, to achieve a joint 
environment, “…each arm of the services needs to retain its own identity and ethos, but 
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each must form part of an integrated whole on operations.”138 However, based on the 
arguments that Iran continues to react against Sunni rule and Western influence, it is 
unlikely that a solid “joint-environment” will be achieved with the UAE.  Although Iran 
has recently reapproached the Gulf States, it is likely that Iran simply wants to dominate 
its neighbors to break out of its regional and international isolation.139 Therefore, a 
successful joint-environment between Iran and the UAE will prove to be problematic.   
Guthrie recommends the implementation of stronger transportation, 
communications, and distribution networks to ensure that deployability and sustainability 
are achieved.  Guthrie argues that “…there are differing levels of support depending on 
the intensity of the conflict, [and] the context may not lend itself to high technology 
weapons, e.g., in the fight against terrorism or insurgents.”140  Effective deployability and 
sustainability would maintain the UAE’s legitimacy within the Gulf region.  Guthrie 
concludes: “…increasing complexity means a potential increase in individual technical 
education and training and in collective training.  Without investment in training, there is 
a risk of not being able to exploit fully the advantages of new technology.”141 Similar to 
the principles behind deployability and sustainability, interoperability will allow the UAE 
to operate under all diplomatic and defense spectrums.  H.H. Sheikh Salem Sabah Al-
Salem Al-Sabah states: 
The elements that contribute to a powerful Gulf region are abundant.  
They stem from the intensified efforts exerted by our leaders and founding 
fathers and are due to their prudence and dedication.  The political will of 
GCC leaders to keep this volatile part of the world free of futile rivalries 
and to deal with international and regional innovations and effective 
developments and influences through a collective performance that 
maintains the common interests, is present.142 
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 As GCC members view the United States as the security guarantor of last resort, 
the United States’ changing policy towards Iran is complicating the continued security 
struggle shared by GCC members.  Therefore, GCC members are now torn between the 
harsh realities that Iran’s growing threat is too dangerous to simply dismiss and the 
United States’ potential economic-influence in the region.  As demonstrated by Maloney: 
Iran’s southern neighbors in the Persian Gulf can be counted as the United 
States’ most reliable regional allies, and their enduring fears of Iran have 
been exacerbated by the Islamic Republic’s political retrenchment as well 
as by its increasing sway within the region…With 400,000 Iranian 
expatriates and a critical role as Iran’s offshore banker and exporter, Dubai 
is particularly vulnerable to any shocks emanating from Iran.  The Gulf 
Cooperation Council will cooperate fully with UN Security Council 
measures but it is unlikely to lead the charge for any effort to build a 
“coalition of the willing” in sanctioning Iran.143 
The GCC members are the most susceptible to both Iran’s growing security threat and to 
any economic pressure that the United States establishes.  Therefore, economic sanctions 
will not only affect Iran, but the results will critically destabilize GCC members.   
 Despite growing concerns over the rise of Iranian power, distinctly through 
political endeavors as well as through its use of proxy groups, the United States’ effort to 
create economic sanctions on Iran, in order to pressure Iran into abandoning policies, are 
simply unrealistic.  In the event that enhanced economic pressure becomes policy, a 
culmination of two unintended outcomes is likely to occur: first, civilians may turn to 
proxy groups, and second, opposition movements will advance. 
1. Implication: Civilians 
When using economic pressure as a strategy to influence government policy, there 
will always be a population that is equally susceptible to sanctions.  In terms of Iran, the 
eruption of intense divisions, caused by the opposition political-movements, have the 
potential to spawn further individual hardships.  Patrick Clawson, Deputy Director for 
Research, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, addressed the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and identified serious structural weaknesses already 
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present in Iran.  Should the United States, and other countries, impose economic 
sanctions on Iran, the civilians, not affiliated with opposition movements, will bear brunt 
of the economic hardships.  Reports and economic indicators already suggest serious 
trouble for Iran: double-digit inflation, a falling stock market, high unemployment rates, 
and continued power shortages.144 Although power shortages are menial, in comparison 
to inflation and the crash in oil prices, deep problems are likely to arise if sanctions are 
imposed.  Clawson indicated that natural gas consumption “continued to be highly 
subsidized with the result that consumption is booming” which is forcing Iran to import 
more gas than it exports.145  Iranian authority arguably does not have the general 
population’s economic situation in mind when implementing policy.  In 2008, 
Turkmenistan cut off gas supplies to Iran, during one of the coldest months in decades.  
Such a sanction on Iran forced Iran to pay higher prices and resulted in the complete shut 
off of gas supplies to over 1.4 million people.146 
The general population will be the lay-target in the United States’ attempt to 
influence Iranian policy using sanctions.  Thus, the question of further political 
instability, rather than compliance, becomes the key issue.  When the population of Iran 
has started to indicate pressures towards a regime change, further economic pressure will 
likely result in a spiraling effect that could be cataclysmic to any stability within Iran.  If 
the general population, not affiliated with opposition movements or proxy groups, views 
the government’s backing of such groups as an economic gain, a person may turn to the 
medium (e.g., Hezbollah) in order to receive the minimal “government support.”  
Although it is a drastic argument, human psychology will dissolve personal attitudes 
when the standard of living dramatically decreases. When the Iranian government has 
little emphasis on the attitudes of the general population, it is that audience that will 
suffer the most should sanctions go into effect, and will therefore become a humanitarian 
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target of vulnerability.  Furthermore, in recent developments, the United States has 
indicated that intensified sanctions may slide into armed confrontation.  Ethan Bronner 
writes: “The United States hopes to prevent any slide into armed confrontation by 
increasing its diplomatic relations with Syria and appealing to President Bashar al-Assad 
to stop transferring arms to Hezbollah.”147  Therefore, Washington already understands 
the implications of intensified sanctions: an escalation of intensified armed-confrontation. 
2. Implication: Opposition Movements 
Directly associated with the impact that sanctions have on civilians is the 
possibility to establish opposition movements.  In order to create policy change, what the 
United States and most countries aim to achieve is the reestablishment of power roles. 
However, what poses a problem to the reestablishment of power roles in Iran is the fact 
that popular and elite backlash against Ahmadinejad already exists.  Therefore, if the 
situation in Iran is the outcome that the United States wishes to establish by using 
sanctions, the question becomes, Why is the Iranian government not abandoning hard-
line policy?  The current atmosphere should then create a situation where the vision of 
the United States is a reality; however, such is not the case.  Maloney points out that 
sanctions would advance the nascent opposition movement within 
Iran…any deterioration in the population’s standard of living will generate 
a renewed backlash against Iran’s leadership at a time when it is already 
suffering a profound legitimacy crisis.148 
The United States and supporters of sanctions must realize that when deterioration 
of power roles is already in place, economic pressure will have little to no effect in 
changing political ideologies.  Economic pressure will likely persuade those Iranians who 
are part of the opposition movement to leave the country rather than act as “allies” in the 
United States’ effort.  Therefore, the problem that the general population will face comes 
back into the picture—economic sanctions will not result in governmental compliances, 
but will rather impede on the directive course of action.  Furthermore, Clawson warns 
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that “Iranian public opinion is likely to exaggerate the impact of the foreign pressure and 
to blame the Ahmadinejad government’s hard-line stance for the country’s economic 
difficulties.”149  Therefore, civil unrest will only continue and possibly cause a wave of 
resentment that will be more difficult to address than policy derailment.   
3. Historical Evidence: The Implications of Sanctions 
 In Suzanne Maloney’s research on the limitation of economic pressure against 
Iran, she indicates three principal reasons why sanctions have not succeeded.  Maloney 
writes: 
History has demonstrated that there simply are no silver bullets with 
respect to Iran…While it is clear that sanctions impose a significant cost 
on Tehran, it is equally evident that, despite the duration and scope of U.S. 
economic pressure on Iran, sanctions have not succeeded in advancing 
their ultimate objective, namely transforming Iran’s foreign and security 
policy for three principal reasons: first, the largely unilateral nature of the 
punitive measures; second, Tehran’s countermeasures, or its capacity for 
mitigation, retaliation, and avoidance; and the third, the apparent 
resistance of Iranian security policy to economic pressures.150 
Maloney’s extensive research exemplifies the harsh realities that sanctions will impose on 
Iran, using historical references and attitudes as a case study.  In her research, Maloney 
indicates that the ongoing implementation of sanctions on Iran, beginning in 1979, has 
not hindered political disagreements, but rather strengthened the Iranian national identity: 
“Past episodes of economic constraint have enhanced cooperation among Iran’s bickering 
factions and increased preparedness to absorb the costs of perpetuating problematic 
policies.”151  Essentially, sanctions on Iran have historically indicated that the governing 
authorities view restrictions as a symbolic defiance that only enhances political disregard 
towards the United States.  More recently, Saeed Jalili, Iran’s nuclear negotiator, 
commented that “We [Iranian’s] have lived with sanctions for 30 years…they [the United 
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States] do not frighten us.  On the contrary, we welcome new sanctions.”152  Such 
attitudes indicate the Iranian belief of self-sufficiency and Iranian identity.  The urgency 
to deal with draining Iranian sources seemingly causes the government to act with 
preparedness, rather than change political posture.  Maloney writes, “…Iranian leaders 
react to sanctions, both real and threatened, by economizing even where such steps risk 
alienating crucial political constituencies, rather than shift their posture on matters judged 
vital to the regime’s security.”153  Therefore, to assume that Iran’s political and security 
agenda will change due to economic pressure has little basis. 
4. Sanctions as a Last Resort 
Although sanctions on Iran are arguably the worst tactical thought at this critical 
point in Iran’s history, if the United States and other nations choose to take economic 
pressures, they should focus on applications that will target the government and the 
proxies, and that will have the least fatal consequences to the people.  Governments 
should determine specific forms of sanctions that will have the most direct impact on the 
government, without further influence to proxy groups.  As many analysts argue, an oil 
embargo would have the most crippling effect; however, the external consequences of an 
oil embargo will discredit such arguments.  George Perkovich, Vice President for Studies 
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, suggests that an oil embargo “must 
be discounted.”154  Perkovich continues:  
People know that most of Iran’s income comes from oil exports and 
assume naturally that the most potent sanction would be to embargo that 
oil…if the world embargoes Iran’s oil, the price of the oil the world buys 
will increase.155 
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B. CONCLUSION 
The argument that sanctions will offer particular utility in forcing Iranian political 
and security policy change, thereby causing limitations in non-state actor 
operations, has little basis.  Maloney’s extensive research on the legitimacy and 
relevancy of sanctions pinpoints an overarching theme: sanctions on Iran, 
historically, do not ameliorate political agendas; due to a lack of coherent 
objectives and the regime’s continued demonstration of will and repression, 
struggling oppositions often do not hold any authority in Iranian cooperation.  On 
September 28, 2009, Mir Hossein Mousavi, candidate for the 2009 Iranian 
elections, urged nations not to impose sanctions against Iran, stating that  
sanctions would not actually act against the government—rather, they 
would only inflict grave distress against a people who have experienced 
enough disaster in their own melancholic statesmen.156   
Although proponents of economic sanctions argue that the atmosphere in Iran is the most 
ideal for a successful political reform, indications would arguably show that diplomatic 
approaches are the most appropriate for success.  The break in the traditional power 
brokers is starting to dissolve traditional regime alliances and the elite have demonstrated 
their backlash against the Ahmadinejad government.   
 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, one of the world’s most prominent applied game 
theorists and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, claims that 
Ahmadinejad’s power is relatively non-existent in the overall governmental authority; 
rather, Iranian “power” is considerably in the hands of “moneyed interests.”  Essentially, 
Bueno de Mesquita argues that Ahmadinejad is slowly on the decline in literal and 
symbolic power in the eyes of the Iranian’s.157  As aforementioned, the political 
atmosphere is strategically beneficial for diplomatic intervention by the United States.  
                                                 
156 Mir Hossein Mousavi, “Mousavi’s Statement #13: Violence is Not the Solution,” Facebook.com 
(September 28, 2009): http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=146201207605 (accessed February 20, 
2010). 
157 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,  “Talks: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita predicts Iran’s Future” (lecture, 
TED Talks, February 2009), 
http://www.ted.com/index.php/talks/bruce_bueno_de_mesquita_predicts_iran_s_future.html (accessed 
February 20, 2010). 
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The key actors are those with money, the elite, and they currently have a strategic power-
advantage over the governing authority.  The United States must not continue to take an 
economic-pressure approach with Iran.  History has indicated that sanctions have relative 
importance to political agendas and in fact solidify internal opposition.  As the world 
continues to fear the capabilities of the Iranian nuclear program and the growing threat of 
asymmetrical warfare, the United States must look at historical evidence and continue the 
often intractable diplomatic process with Iran in order to curb Iran’s crossing of the 
threshold of complete crisis with escalated proxy-group involvement.  Baer summates: 
…America could take its medicine and sit down at the negotiating table 
with Iran, treat it like the power it has become, and see what it has to offer.  
This would be a bitter pill, acknowledging Iran’s predominance in the 
Middle East—declaring Iran a superpower if that’s what it wants to be 
called.  But we would finally find out if there’s truly a confluence of 
interests…We would answer the question: As an ally, would Iran be more 
reliable and more reasonable than the Sunnis, the sect we’ve so long 
placed such blind trust in?158 
 Therefore, to pose the question again: What conclusion should one draw from 
Baer and Maloney’s warnings about Iraq?  Baer’s conversation with a contact in 
Hezbollah may elicit the bases of personal analysis: 
In February 2003, a little less than a month before Americans invaded 
Iraq, a contact in Hezbollah called me, gleefully announcing that the Iraqi-
born members of Hezbollah were packing up to go home.  Many of them 
hadn’t been back since 1980, when Saddam expelled them to Iran and 
Lebanon. 
“What are they going to do?” I asked, purposely sounding naïve. 
“Organize Iraqi Hezbollah, of course.  Take over Iraq.” 
“But how many of them are there?” 
“I don’t know.  Two or three hundred.” 
“Is that enough?” 
“It was in Lebanon, no?” he said as he hung up the phone… 
                                                 
158 Baer, The Devil We Know, 251. 
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Iran knew that with Saddam gone, secular Iraq was dead, making the Iraqi 
Shia ripe for the picking to fight a holy war against Western occupation.  
The Iraqi Shia would reject occupation just as surely as the Lebanese had 
rejected in 1982.  And Iran also knew Lebanon would be the strategic 
blueprint for its war of liberation:  Iran would dominate Iraq not by 
invading it outright, but rather through proxies, spreading religious 
conviction, and employing the new form of guerrilla warfare it had learned 
in Lebanon.159 
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